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Abstract—Single Event Upset is a common source of failure
in microprocessor-based systems working in environment with
increased radiation level especially in places like accelerators and
synchrotrons, where sophisticated digital devices operate closely
to the radiation source. One of the possible solutions to increase
the radiation immunity of the microprocessor systems is a strict
programming approach known as the Software Implemented
Hardware Fault Tolerance. Unfortunately, a manual implementa-
tion of SIHFT algorithms is difficult and can introduce additional
problems with program functionality caused by human errors.
In this paper author presents new approach to this problem,
that is based on the modifications of the source code of the C
language compiler. Protection methods are applied automatically
during source code processing at intermediate representation of
the compiled program.
Index Terms—Software implemented hardware fault tolerance,
Compilation techniques, Table protection algorithm, Single event
upset, Radiation tolerant system, Radiation environment
I. INTRODUCTION
Soft error or hardware transient fault appears in electronic
device when highly energized particle strikes sensitive region
of circuit. This phenomena can cause no observable effects,
transient disruption of the system operations or a change of
logic state in data stored in the memory cells. Soft errors do
not permanently damage the hardware, but cause unpredictable
behavior of computer-based systems and consequently lead
to loss of functionality. They are a source of problems in
electronics working not only in a radioactive environment
like accelerators or cosmic space, but also at a terrestrial
altitude [1], [2]. According to the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) ”radiation induced errors in
microelectronic circuits caused when charged particles lose
energy by ionizing the medium through which they pass,
leaving behind a wake of electron-hole pairs [3]” are known
as SEU’s - Single Event Upsets. A change of single bit,
induced by the radiation is called SBU - Single Bit Upset.
On the other hand, if more than one bit was affected a
Multi Bit Upset (MBU) has occurred. Effects when several
SEUs lead to disruption of system functionality are called
SEFIs - Single Event Functional Interrupts. Besides artificial
radiation environments like accelerators or nuclear reactors
three natural sources can cause soft errors: alpha particles from
natural radioactive impurities in the device materials, high
energy cosmic rays, and secondary radiation induced from the
interaction of cosmic rays and boron [4], [5].
Semiconductor devices are more and more sensitive to the
radiation because of increasing demand for higher density and
lower voltage. Therefore, the problem of radiation influence
has to be taken into consideration during each stage of the
system development. Several techniques to protect devices
from soft errors have been designed. Four main group of
radiation mitigation techniques can be distinguished:
• hardening on the design stage,
• shielding,
• techniques implementing radiation-tolerant solutions at
the circuit or system level,
• strict programming approach to fault tolerance called
Software Implemented Hardware Fault Tolerance.
Detail analyze of three first methods is beyond the scope of
this paper therefore next subsections address only software-
based radiation protection algorithms.
II. SOFTWARE-BASED RADIATION PROTECTION
Software-based radiation protection techniques are intro-
duced to the original source code of application – manually
during the development of software [6], [7] or automatically
during the compilation of program [8], [9]. They enable a
system to tolerant software faults induced by the interaction
between radiation and hardware components of the system.
When the faults occurs, they provide a mechanism to the
software to prevent system failure from occurring. Software-
based radiation protection provides services by typically using
variable duplication, control sums and redundancy at instruc-
tion, source code blocks, procedure or entire program level.
This approach can be used in nuclear powers, aerospace, health
care or telecommunication.
According to this description, program not only has to
satisfy functional specification, but also has to use special
algorithms to monitor functionality, detect, signal and correct
hardware errors. It is a strictly software approach, it can be
implemented either in a source code written in high level
programming language or assembler. It could be used with
unhardened, commercial of-the-shelf components [10].
Two types of protection algorithms can be distinguished:
• data protection algorithms,
• control flow checking algorithms [11]
Algorithms belonging to the first category are described in
next parts of this paper, while the second type algorithms at
this moment are beyond the scope of our interest.
III. HARDENING THE DATA
A. State of The Art
Several software methods for hardening a system against
faults affecting the data were developed. In most cases, they
exploit instruction and information redundancy and are based
on program modifications. Redundancy can be introduced at
four levels of granularity: instruction, instruction block, proce-
dure and program. At the instruction level individual operation
called master instruction is duplicated and so called shadow
instruction is introduced. Both sets of source code are executed
and results are compared. In the case of inconsistency, appro-
priate error recovery function must be executed. In second
level of granularity, selected parts of program i.e. basic blocks
determined in program source code are duplicated. With the
procedure level duplication, results of duplicated procedures
are compared. In last approach, outputs of two copies of an
entire program are compared in order to detect possible faults.
Original program and its copy can be executed concurrently or
one after another depending on available hardware resources.
In this paper only duplication on instruction-level will be taken
into consideration.
First of presented protection algorithm belongs to the High
Level Instruction Duplication (HLID) group [12]. This method
is based on data and instruction redundancy and covers the set
of source code transformation that follows three fundamental
rules:
• every variable in program must be duplicated,
• every write operation has to be performed on both, copies
of the variable,
• after each read operation on variable, checking for con-
sistency has to be done. In the case of inconsistency an
appropriate error recovery procedure has to be executed.
This basic rules have to be applied not only to statements
like assignments or arithmetical operations but also for ev-
ery procedure call in order to protect passed parameters as
well as returned value. Method can be used with high level
source code, but it does have the disadvantage of introducing
large number of additional code, in particular conditions and
brunches.
Second solution to protect microprocessor-based system
against transient error is called Error-Detection by Duplicated
Instructions (EDDI)[13] and belongs to the Assembler-Level
Instruction Duplication group. Every instruction in assembler
source code is duplicated, different set of registers must be
used in both operations. In the case of store or conditional
branch instruction, appropriate registers are compared and
in the case of data inconsistency error handler procedure
is invoked. The store is an instruction that store the value
of variable in memory. Additionally, to increase program
efficiency, several instruction scheduling algorithms can be
used. The main disadvantage, apart from increase in the code
size and lost of performance, is necessity to the assembler level
implementation. For that reason, method is target-dependent
and must be separately adopted for different processor fami-
lies.
B. Theoretical Background
The following subsection presents a number of definitions
essential for understanding proposed new data hardening al-
gorithm.
Definition 1: A basic block (node in control flow graph)
is a maximal sequence of consecutive instructions with the
properties, that flow of control can only enter the basic block
through the first instruction and will leave the block without
halting or branching. A recovery basic block is a modified
version of standard basic block, where function call statement
is boundaries for block and jump instructions together with
function call constitute separate type of block called the jump
block.
Definition 2: Control flow graph is a directed graph where
nodes correspond to the basic blocks and edges correspond to
control transfers between basic blocks. In the flow graph, two
nodes have special properties. Entry is a point where procedure
starts, thus, it is node with no predecessor. Exit is a point where
procedure exits, therefore, it is a node with no successors [14].
Recovery control flow graph is a control flow graph where
nodes are recovery basic blocks and jump blocks. Example of
recovery control flow graph is presented in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. Example of control flow graph and recovery control flow graph
Definition 3: A variable or a temporary is said to be defined
when it is assigned a value, that is, when the variable or
temporary is a destination of instruction. A variable is said
to by used when it appears as a source operand in instruction.
The last use of a variable is a program point or instruction
where the variable is used for the last time in the program or
used for the last time before is it redefined. The live range
of a variable starts from its definition and ends at its last use.
A variable is said to be live during its live range [15]. An
example of live range is presented in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2. An example sequence of source code and appropriate variables live
ranges.
Definition 4: Lets take into consideration two instructions
I1 oraz I2. The instruction I2 is dependent on I1 if and only
if there is a path in the flow graph from I1 to I2 and the
instructions might reference the same memory location [16].
Four types of dependence can be distinguished:
• The dependence is true dependence if I1 is a store
operation and I2 is a load operation,
• The dependence is an antidependence if I1 is a load
operation and I2 is a store operation,
• The dependence is an output dependence if both instruc-
tions are store operations,
• The dependence is an input dependence if both instruc-
tions are load instructions
IV. RECOVERY INSTRUCTION DUPLICATION
Recovery instruction duplication (RID) algorithm presented
in this paper is combination of both earlier introduced ap-
proaches. On one hand, program transformations are imple-
mented in the high level source code, similarly to the High
Level Instruction Duplication method. On the other hand, data
consistency checking is performed only if additional condi-
tions are fulfilled, like in the Error-Detection by Duplicated
Instructions algorithm.
RID method is based on backward recovery approach [17].
It attempts to return the system to a error-free state by
rolling back or restoring the system to previously saved
correct conditions. System states are recorded at the recovery
checkpoints selected during the source code compilation. In
the case of error detection, the system state is restored to
last saved point and program execution is continued from
the checkpoint. Algorithm is implemented at the recovery
basic blocks level, therefore checkpoints are introduced to
the source code at the beginning of each block and data
consistency checking is performed at the end of each block,
see Fig. 3. Original instructions are duplicated and so called
shadow instructions are introduced to program. Results of
computation of both copies of variables that are live at the
end of recovery basic block, are compared and in the case
of data inconsistency, previous state of each of variable is
Fig. 3. Location of checkpoint and data consistency checking procedures in
recovery basic block
restored and recovery mechanism is executed. Copy of local
variables required to perform rollback procedure are stored
in the one-dimensional array called the recovery array. To
increase reliability of algorithm, storage area is additionally
guarded by Array Protection Algorithm, described in details
in [8] and [9]. At the end of block, consistency of backup
copies is checked and contents of array is updated. Dead
variables are removed, new live variables are inserted. The
size of recovery array is equal to the maximum number of live
variables existing in parallel at the beginning of the recovery
blocks with properties that next use is inside block. Therefore
advanced data flow analyze is required. For example array size
for source code presented in Fig. 2 is zero and in Fig. 4 is
one. Example implementation of RID algorithm is presented in
Fig. 4. An example implementation of Recovery Instruction Duplication
algorithm. On the left side – input source code with marked variables live
ranges and recovery basic block boundaries, on the right side – source code
after algorithm implementation.
Fig. 4. Variable a, b and c are live at the beginning of recovery
basic block. However, only b has to be stored in recovery array
because first use of variable a and c is after new definitions in
block. Based on dependency analyze one can deduce that the
rest of instruction depends on the definition of variable b that
is located outside of currently processed block. Additionally,
informations about dependencies between instructions can be
used to select minimal group of variable stored into recovery
array. Functions: store, load and remove are responsible for
adding, reading and deleting specified variable from storage
area with the use of Array Protection Algorithm approach.
Variable b is dead outside of the block, therefore it must be
removed from recovery array. On the other hand, z and c
are new live variables and consequently they are inserted into
storage area. Every instructions are duplicated and at the end
of block, consistency of live variable – z and c – is checked.
In the case of difference between the copies, original values
of input variables are restored – in analyzed example there is
only one variable b – and instructions in block are executed
ones again. Variables live between several blocks are stored
and protected into recovery array.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Recovery Instruction Duplication algorithm, presented in
this paper, represents alternative approach to the problem
of local variable protection. The main difference between
Recovery Instruction Duplication and High Level Instruction
Duplication algorithm is fact, that in first approach value
consistency checking is performed only for limited set of
variables. This feature is very important if algorithm is im-
plemented at intermediate representation of source code used
by compiler. Representation like three-address code allows to
use in one statement assignment and one additional operator
with maximum two arguments. Therefore, several temporary
variables for intermediate computation results must be intro-
duced. In most cases, temporaries are available only in one
block of source code. Consistency checking performed for
every temporal variable will significantly increase the size
of program source code. In RID algorithm temporaries are
protected only if they are used outside of one recovery basic
block. In both approaches every instructions are duplicated
and operations are performed on two sets of variables.
Algorithm RID has been adopted to implementation in
source code written in high level programming language. For
that reason and in contrast to Error-Detection by Duplicated
Instructions, it is independent on the targeted hardware archi-
tecture. In both approaches consistency checking is postponed,
in EDDI algorithms it is performed only for operations that
write data to memory, in RID it is done only for live variable.
The main drawbacks of presented method are increase of a
final code size and a decrease of program efficiency. Both dis-
advantages result from additional operations like comparisons
and instruction duplication inserted into program to increase
reliability of the system. Nevertheless, this is characteristic
feature of every algorithms based on the redundancy. Ad-
vanced data flow and control flow analyze can be the source
of information that allows to decrease this negative influence
on protected program.
Presented algorithm can be treated as a form of temporal
redundancy. In the case of error, the same source code is
executed ones again. Simple correction of data and reuse of the
same software can overcome transient faults induced by the
radiation. On the other hand, temporal redundancy introduce
unpredictable delays to the application. Therefore applications
with hard real-time constrains are not good candidates for this
solution.
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